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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The wife should be awarded an interest in the business known as Stoney Motors.
The Husband's and Wife's business, Stoney Motors, was created during the marriage
and should have been equitably divided by the Court, regardless of whether or not it
included good will attributed to the husband. The Trial Court inappropriately relied upon
the reasoning in the case of Sorenson v. Sorenson, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992) which
applied to a professional corporation where the income was used to pay significant
amounts of alimony and child support. The Court should have equitably divided the
value of the business, including its good will, in accordance with the rule of the Court in
Gardner v.Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah App. 1991).

II
The Husband should be required to pay one-half (Vi) of the $52,000.00 loan owed to
Mr. Carl Manzel
The Husband and Wife paid off their credit card debts in 2001 with a loan from the
wife's father. The credit card debts were for bills the parties jointly incurred and included
debts incurred from gambling. Both the wife and husband were present during the time
these gambling debts were incurred. The parties separated twice after this loan was made
and each time reconciled their marriage. The Trial Court found that the husband knew
about the debts and by reconciling with the wife, forgave her of any debts that were
incurred prior to the date of reconciliation. The Court denied the husband's claim that he
should be excused from paying a portion of the marital debts because of dissipation and
found that any debts incurred during the marriage before the final separation, which was
in July 31, 2003, should be divided equally. The Court's conclusion that the Wife should
be solely responsible for the $52,000.00 dollar loan to her father is inconsistent with the
Court's findings and should be reversed.
Ill
Attorney's Fees
The Wife was awarded attorney's fees at the Trial level and should be awarded
attorney's fees on Appeal.

ARGUMENTS
I
The wife should be awarded an interest in the business known as Stoney Motors.
The Trial Court concluded that Stoney Motors, a car dealership, should
not be divided as a marital asset because its value included the good will of the husband.
The Court found "The Petitioner claims the dealership has no value for good will, and
therefore, the wife is not entitled to any monitory compensation from the dealership." (F.
of Fct. f 13). The Court concluded "The court finds that the Respondent is not entitled to
receive any portion of Stoney Motors as a marital asset. The court finds that the good
will of Stoney Motors is solely attributable to the Petitioner's personal, professional
reputation. The Respondent is not awarded anything for the good will of Stoney Motors."
(F. of Fct. f 24). An Appellant Court gives deference to a Finding of Fact because the
Trial Court judges the creditability of witnesses. However, a Conclusion on Law is
reviewed for correctness and given no special deference. Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d
1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991).
The Court did not find that the dealership had no value because of good will.
Paragraph 13 of the Court's Findings of Fact, states that the Husband claims that it has no
value for good will. The Court found that Chuck Ulrich an accountant testifying on
behalf of the Wife valued the business at $200,000.00. (F. of Fct. f 14) The Court
concluded that the good will of Stoney Motors resulted solely from the Husband's
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personal and professional reputation, and that the Wife should not be awarded anything
for the good will of Stoney Motors. (F. of Fct. ^f 24) The Court did not conclude that the
entire value of Stoney Motors was good will. The wife's accountant, Chuck Ulrich took
into consideration that the business was run personally by the husband in his evaluation of
the business. (Vol V. Tr. 829-831) The Court made no determination of what portion of
the value of Stoney Motors was for good will.
Stoney Motors is a used car dealership that was created in the year 2001 as a Limited
Liability Company. The wife was a 50% owner of Stoney Motors. (F. of Fct. f 7, 8, and
10) The husband in his reply brief argues the facts related to the evaluation of the
business. If the husband wants to challenge the factual findings of the Court, he must
marshall all evidence in favor of the position of the wife. Moon v. Moon. 973 P.2d 431,
437 (Utah App.1999) The value of the business is not the issue before this Court on the
wife's cross appeal. The issue is whether or not good will in a non-professional business
should be divided by the Trial Court. That is an issue of law. An issue of law is not
entitled to any deference on Appeal. Howell Supra.
The Supreme Court in the case of Gardner v. Gardner 748,P2 1076, 1079 (Utah App.
1988) stated "...Thus, marital property 'encompasses all of the assets of every nature
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived; and this
includes any such pension fund or insurance.' Englert v Englert, 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah
1978)." The Court also stated in the second paragraph of footnote 1, on page 1080 "The
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ability of a business to generate income from its continued patronage is commonly
referred to as good will. Good will is properly subject to equitable distribution upon
divorce, "see, e.g., Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2 1 (1983); Matter of Marriage
ofFleege, 91 Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979). But see The Treatment of Good Will
in Divorce Proceedings, 18 Fam.L.Q. 213 (1984)." The same statement of law was made
by the Court of Appeals in the case of Dunn v. Dunn 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah App.
1990). This rule has long been the law in the State of Utah. The Supreme Court in case
of Sorenson v. Sorenson. 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992) made an exception to this rule when
the company was a professional corporation where the income of that corporation was
used to pay significant amounts of alimony and child support to the spouse. That case is
discussed in detail in point nine of the Appellee's Cross Appeal.
The question before this Court is a legal question as to whether or not good will in a
non professional business is subject to division by the Trial Court. Most small nonprofessional businesses include a significant value for good will. The fact that a business
contains good will should not be a basis upon which a Trial Court can refuse to divide the
value of the business. Otherwise, in many divorce actions, a Court would have to exclude
the value of businesses that are created during the course of the marriage.
The failure of this Court to reverse the Trial Court's decision would result in the
decision of the Court in the Sorenson case, which specifically related to a professional
corporation, being extended to all small business that involves good will. The wife
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contends that was not the intent nor the ruling in the Sorenson case, and that the Trial
Court's reliance upon the Sorenson case to deny the wife any portion of the automobile
business, created by the parties during the course of their marriage, is an incorrect
application of law.
II
The Husband should be required to pay one-half (Vi) of the $52,000.00 loan owed to
Mr. Carl Manzel.
The loan from the wife's father, Carl Manzel was made in 2001 to pay off credit cards
ofboth the Wife and Husband. (VolVITr. 1090:10-1092:22) The loan was made to the
parties before their first and second separation. (Vol IV Tr. 652) The Trial Court in its
findings denied the husband's claim that he should be excused from paying a portion of
the marital debts because of dissipation. (F. of Fct.| 51) The Court also found that any
debts incurred during the marriage and before the final separation, which was July 31,
2003, should be divided equally regardless of who incurred the debt or loan. (F of Fct. %
73) The Court found that the husband knew about the debts incurred during the marriage.
(F of Fct. % 74) The Court found that the parties reconciled after their first and second
separation and that the husband forgave the wife for any debts incurred during those
separations and thus those debts became marital debts to be divided equally. (F of Fct. |
75 and 76)
The husband claims that the $52,000.00 loan from Carl Manzel was for gambling
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debts. The Court made so such finding. The husband's accountant prepared a document
entitled "Jackie Stonehocker's Cash Flow 1999-2004" which is attached as Exhibit 3 to
the husband's Appeal Brief. The wife disputed much of the information in that
document. However, that document shows that monies were expended for gambling in
1999 in the sum of $43,130.00, in 2000 in the sum of $10,300, in 2001 in the sum of
$1,675.00, and additional amounts for the years 2002, 2003, and 2004. That document
shows that there were credit card payments in 1999 in the sum of $30,921.00, in 2000 in
the sum of $8,925.00 and in 2001 in the sum of $6,992.00. It is clear that these debts
were incurred prior to the loan from the wife's father, Carl Manzel in the 2001. The
wife's testimony during the course of the trial was that the husband was present with her
when she went to Wendover and that the parties not only experienced losses but gains
from gambling which were reported on their income tax returns. (Vol IV Tr. 694 line 7 697 line 18) The Court found that the husband forgave the wife for any of those debts
and they were to be divided equally.
The husband in his Reply Brief cites language from the Court in the September 25,
2005 hearing that the Court got the impression that the loan was to pay off gambling
debts. The Court did not receive any evidence at the September 25, 2005 hearing.
During the course of the trial, the Wife's attorney objected to the husband's questions
concerning the debts that were paid off with the loan from the wife's father. In
commenting on relevance, the Court stated "It isn't to me. It may be the grounds for the
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Divorce, but I don't know why it makes any difference." (Vol VI Tr. 1193 Line 19-20)
"See, I guess my question is, if they loaned her $52,000.00, does it really matter what it
was spent for?" (Vol VI Tr. 1194 line 19-21) The Court also commented that not all the
loan was for gambling debts. (Vol V Tr. 1196 line 6) Based upon findings made by the
Court there is no basis for the Court to require the wife to be solely responsible for the
$52,000.00 debt to her father. The Court's conclusion that the wife is solely responsible
for the $52,000.00 loan to her father is inconsistent with the finding and should be
reversed by this Court.
Ill
Attorney's Fees
The wife was awarded attorney fees by the Trial Court and she has requested that this
Court awarded her attorney's fees on appeal. The husband in his Reply Brief raises for
the first time that the motion which resulted in the July 5, 2005, hearing was not brought
under Rules 54(a), 59(a) or 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The husband in
his Reply Brief Statement of Facts acknowledges that a Memorandum Decision was
signed by Judge Jones on the 5th day of July 2005 and thereafter the wife filed a Motion
for Clarification on the 10th day of August 2005 and the husband filed a Motion for
Clarification and to Review the Memorandum Decision on the 11th day of August 2005.
(Page 3 of the husband's Reply Brief). The same information is contained in the wife's
Brief under Statements of the Case on pages three and four. The husband and wife both
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joined in Motions asking the Court to clarify, review, and/or modify its Memorandum
Decision. The husband relies upon the Trial Court's comments in the September 25,
2005 hearing to support point two in his Reply Memorandum, where he quotes comments
made by the Trial Judge at that hearing.
The husband cannot participate in an agreed upon hearing to clarify and/or modify the
Court Memorandum Decision and then on Appeal for the first time claim that the Court's
Clarification of its Memorandum Decision cannot be relied upon or is not binding on the
parties.
CONCLUSIONS
The Trial Court committed an error of Law in failing to divide the business known as
Stoney Motors because it included good will of the husband. The Court's reasoning in
the case of Sorenson Supra, which applied to a professional corporation where the
income of the corporation was used to pay a significant amount of alimony and child
support is not applicable to the Stoney Motors' business which buys and sells used
automobiles.
The Court made no findings which justified its conclusion that the wife should be
solely responsible for a debt from her father in the sum of $52,000.00 which was used to
pay off credit cards incurred by both the wife and husband. The findings all support a
conclusion that each party should be responsible for one-half QA) of the debt owed to the
wife's father.
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The Wife was awarded attorney's fees by the Trial Court. The Wife requests that this
Court award her attorney's fees on Appeal.
DATED this

day of June 2007.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee/
Cross Appellant
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